![]() ![]() The difficulty was that Court decisions on the right to vote, the right to travel, the right to procreate, as well as other rights, premise the constitutional violation to be of the Equal Protection Clause, which does not itself guarantee the right but prevents the differential governmental treatment of those attempting to exercise the right. A right to education is not expressly protected by the Constitution, continued the Court, and it was unwilling to find an implied right because of its undoubted importance.īut just as Rodriguez did not ultimately prevent the Court’s adoption of a “three-tier” or “sliding-tier” standard of review, Justice Powell's admonition that only interests expressly or impliedly protected by the Constitution should be considered “fundamental” did not prevent the expansion of the list of such interests. at 62 (Justice Brennan dissenting), 70, 110-17 (Justices Marshall and Douglas dissenting). he answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.” 14 Footnote 411 U.S. “But the importance of a service performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause. ![]() The Court readily agreed that education was an important value in our society. the Court also sought to rationalize and restrict this branch of active review, as that case involved both a claim that de facto wealth classifications should be suspect and a claim that education was a fundamental interest, so that providing less of it to people because they were poor triggered a compelling state interest standard. In Rodriguez, 13 Footnote San Antonio Indep. were at least some of those interests that triggered active review when de jure or de facto official distinctions were made with respect to them. and the right of procreation 12 Footnote Skinner v. the right to be free of wealth distinctions in the criminal process, 11 Footnote E.g., Tate v. the right of interstate travel, 10 Footnote E.g., Shapiro v. it was evident from the cases that the right to vote, 9 Footnote E.g., Dunn v. 330 (1972).Īlthough no opinion of the Court attempted to delineate the process by which certain “fundamental” rights were differentiated from others, 8 Footnote This indefiniteness has been a recurring theme in dissents. Thereafter, the phrase was used in several voting cases in which restrictions were voided, and the doctrine was asserted in other cases. and the phrase “compelling state interest” was used several times in Justice Brennan’s opinion in Shapiro v. A stiffening of the traditional test could be noted in the opinion of the Court striking down certain restrictions on voting eligibility 5 Footnote Carrington v. in which the Court subjected to “strict scrutiny” a state statute providing for compulsory sterilization of habitual criminals, such scrutiny being thought necessary because the law affected “one of the basic civil rights.” In the apportionment decisions, Chief Justice Warren observed that, “since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” 4 Footnote Reynolds v. that the “fundamental right” theory had its origins in Skinner v. The effect of applying the test, as in the other branch of active review, is to deny to legislative judgments the deference usually accorded them and to dispense with the general presumption of constitutionality usually given state classifications. The other phase of active review of classifications holds that when certain fundamental liberties and interests are involved, government classifications which adversely affect them must be justified by a showing of a compelling interest necessitating the classification and by a showing that the distinctions are required to further the governmental purpose. ![]() No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Amdt14.S1.4.3.1 Equal Protection: OverviewĪll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. ![]()
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